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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether § 6928(d)(3) of the Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act was violated by Charles Canner where neither
the legislative history nor the present facts demonstrate that
such a result is warranted?
2. Whether a corporate officer violated the "knowing" re-
quirement of § 6928(d)(3) when corporate policies placed the
opportunity to gain any knowledge regarding environmental
issues outside his corporate role?
3. Whether the district court properly denied Mr. Canner's
motion for acquittal where the evidence illustrates that only
Mr. Barker effectively caused the violation?
4. Assuming this court implies the Reasonable Corporate Of-
ficer Doctrine into § 6928(d)(3), whether Mr. Canner has vio-
lated the statute where only his plant manager, Barker, pos-
sessed the knowledge and authority to deal with the problem?
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FACTS
Charles Canner has been the president of Omni corpora-
tion since its founding in 1982 (R. 1). The prosperity of Omni
has significantly contributed to the economic rebirth of the
community of New Union City. Omni currently employs ap-
proximately 1200 workers, many of whom were formerly un-
employed. Additionally, Omni's presence in New Union City
has produced positive effects on the area crime rate and local
property values (R. 1). Mr. Canner himself has proven to be
an outstanding civic leader. His roles include serving as presi-
dent of the New Union City General Hospital and Chairman
of the New Union Council of Fine Arts (R. 2).
On June 26, 1989, a New Union City policeman noticed
an Omni truck pull off to the side of the road near the Omni
plant. The officer noted that the truck was leaking a yellow
liquid in his logbook but did not investigate further (R. 2). On
June 29 and 30, 1989, the EPA regional office received some
citizen complaints about chemical odors from a discolored
patch of ground outside the gate of the Omni plant (R. 3).
Diane Durden, an EPA investigator, visited the site, took a
soil sample, and sent it to the lab. The lab found that the soil
contained DWE, a toxic substance.
On August 2, 1989, Inspector Durden sent a letter to Mr.
Canner, stating that DWE was discovered outside the Omni
plant, and asking whether Canner knew of its source (R. 3).
This letter never reached Mr. Canner personally. Frank
Formes, Mr. Canner's assistant, directed the letter to Mr.
Barker, the plant manager (R. 3). This action was consistent
with Omni's longstanding policy of forwarding environmental
matters directly to Mr. Barker (R. 3).
Barker called Arnold Adams into his office after he re-
ceived Inspector Durden's letter (R. 4). At the time, Arnold
Adams was an inexperienced 23-year old facilities manager.
Adams was responsible for maintenance and building services,
including waste disposal (R. 2). Adams told Barker that one of
the trucks had a leak in the cargo area reported on June 28,
1989 and that it was possible that the spill had come from
that truck (R. 4). Adams did not know whether the leaking
[Vol. 8
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truck carried DWE as no driver reported any spills. Further-
more, DWE is transported by other firms whose trucks pass
by the area where the spill occurred. Adams offered to investi-
gate the matter further. However, Barker instructed Adams
not to, saying, "That's not our job." Barker then told Adams:
"You're new to this business, and I'll give you some advice.
Keep your mind on your work. We build hypercomputers.
People like EPA inspectors are always asking a lot of ques-
tions. Answer their questions truthfully, but don't volunteer
more than that" (R. 4).
Adams called Inspector Durden on August 9, 1989. He
told her that no one at Omni knew the source of the spill. He
also offered Durden the opportunity to visit the plant (R. 4).
Inspector Durden wrote a memo summarizing the call from
Adams. Adams then reported this conversation to Barker. Ap-
parently approving what Adams said, Barker acknowledged
Adams by nodding his head (R. 4).
Defendants Canner and Barker were convicted at trial of
violating § 6928(d)(3). They appealed their convictions and
the district court's ruling denying their motions for judgment
of acquittal. In ruling on the motions for acquittal, the district
court held that a false statement had been made by Adams
(R. 5). The district court also held that Mr. Barker possessed
the requisite level of knowledge (R. 6). The district court then
implied the responsible corporate officer doctrine into the
statute because it thought "Congress intended . . . to put a
duty on corporate officials to be responsible for actions under
their supervision" (R. 6). The district court then applied the
responsible corporate officer doctrine to extend liability to Mr.
Canner (R. 6). According to the district court, if it did not
extend liability to Mr. Canner it would "be establishing [an]
incentive ... for other corporate executives to insulate them-
selves from knowing anything about the environmental ac-
tions of their companies" (R. 6).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Canner argues that his conviction mandates re-
versal because RCRA § 6928(d)(3) was not intended to govern
1991]
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the alleged violation. The legislative history suggests that this
provision was intended to govern false statements made re-
garding the illegal transportation of hazardous wastes. It was
not intended to cover alleged false statements made during a
phone conversation concerning a spill that may have occurred
while legally transporting wastes to a recycler.
Appellant further contends that he cannot be convicted
under the statute because his actions did not constitute a vio-
lation of § 6928(d)(3). Mr. Canner did not "knowingly omit
material information or make any false material statement or
representation" because he played no role in the events that
led to this litigation. He did not receive the letter from In-
spector Durden because it was routed to Barker pursuant to
corporation policy. Therefore, appellant's conviction cannot
be sustained under § 6928(d)(3).
Moreover, appellant argues that Adams' actions did not
constitute a violation of the statute. Mr. Canner contends that
Adams made no false statement, that the telephone conversa-
tion is not a "report" within the meaning of the statute, and
that Inspector Durden did not "file, maintain or use for pur-
poses of compliance" the information she received form
Adams.
Charles Canner's conviction must also be reversed be-
cause the government has failed to prove Mr. Canner "know-
ingly" circumvented the statute in question. One of the crimi-
nal law's most fundamental truths declares that a law's mens
rea element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in or-
der to gain a conviction. The factual record does not contain a
single hint of evidence which might suggest Charles Canner
knew of the facts constituting the alleged violation.
Reported decisions of § 6928(d) illustrate that the stat-
ute's "knowingly" standard cannot be dispensed with under
any circumstances. Each individual charged pursuant to this
section must be shown to have possessed the required knowl-
edge. Furthermore, § 6928(d) is not a strict liability statute.
The physical presence of a mens rea element within the stat-
ute, coupled with relevant judicial interpretations refute any
analogy to a strict liability case.
Mr. Canner's position as Omni's president is not a foun-
[Vol. 8
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dation upon which knowledge of the violation may be im-
puted. Omni developed a policy whereby environmental com-
pliance would be most efficiently satisfied. This procedure was
not designed to insulate Mr. Canner from liability, but was
instead structured to provide swift and competent response
measures. Additionally, to rule that Mr. Canner deliberately
avoided becoming aware of the present charge is not only le-
gally unsound, but is also tantamount to holding that corpo-
rate officers may never delegate authority.
Contrary to several analogous environmental statutes, §
6928(d) does not expressly provide for "responsible corporate
officer" liability. Consequently, under § 6928(d) corporate offi-
cials cannot be found to have violated the law merely because
their duties were somehow related to the alleged violation.
This Court must not act where Congress has distinctly refused
to do so. The stigma of criminal liability will only serve to
repress an innovative leader and quell the economic prosper-
ity of a corporation upon which the future of a community
relies. Conceding the importance of environmental regula-
tions, it is nonetheless equally imperative to recognize that
certain situations do not warrant punishment. Mr. Canner's
predicament is such a situation.
The evidence unequivocally demonstrates that only Mr.
Barker acted knowingly. The only evidence in the record re-
garding Mr. Canner's conduct was his act of delegating re-
sponsibility for environmental compliance to Mr. Barker. The
facts demonstrate that Mr. Canner was not aware that false
statements or violations of environmental laws would be prac-
tically certain to follow from his policy of delegating authority
for environmental compliance to Mr. Barker.
Mr. Barker acted knowingly by inducing Mr. Adams to
rely on his "advice." Mr. Adams conveyed the essence of that
advice to Inspector Durden. Mr Barker acted knowingly be-
cause he must have been aware that Adams' statement to In-
spector Durden was practically certain to follow from the "ad-
vice" he gave Mr. Adams.
By inducing Adams to rely on his advice, Barker effec-
tively caused the alleged violation. There is no evidence, how-
ever, that Mr. Canner effectively caused any alleged violation.
1991]
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Mr. Canner did not know about the allegedly illegal conduct.
Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting Mr. Canner could
not rely on his system of delegating environmental compliance
to Mr. Barker. Finally, there is no evidence that Mr. Canner
induced Mr. Adams to make the allegedly false statement.
Consequently, Mr. Canner cannot be held to have caused the
violation.
Even if this court implies the responsible corporate officer
doctrine into the statute, the leading cases and authorities
agree that the "knowingly" requirement cannot be read out of
the statute. Under the responsible corporate officer doctrine,
the government must prove that Messrs. Canner and Barker
failed to exercise the proper level of vigilance and foresight to
prevent the alleged violation.
Mr. Canner did not fail to exercise the proper level of vig-
ilance because he did not know he could not rely on his sys-
tem of delegating environmental compliance to Mr. Barker. If
a violation did occur it is because Mr. Barker did not exercise
vigilance to ensure Mr. Adams acted appropriately. Addition-
ally, Mr. Barker failed to exercise vigilance because he did not
promptly correct any allegedly false statements Mr. Adams
made after Adams reported the substance of his conversation
with Inspector Durden to him.
Finally, Mr. Canner did not fail to exercise the proper
level of foresight to prevent the violation. Mr. Canner could
not have foreseen any problems because he had no notice that
he could not rely on Mr. Barker to ensure the plant operated
within the boundaries of the law. If a violation is found, Mr.
Barker's conduct of concealing the matter negates the possi-
bility that Mr. Canner could have foreseen and therefore pre-
vented the alleged violation from occurring.
ARGUMENT
I. APPELLANT CANNER'S CONVICTION MANDATES
REVERSAL BECAUSE RCRA SECTION 6928(D)(3)
WAS NOT INTENDED TO GOVERN THE ALLEGED
VIOLATION IN THE PRESENT CASE.
Appellant Canner has been convicted of violating §
[Vol. 8
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6928(d)(3) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
This section imposes criminal penalties on any person who:
knowingly omits material information or makes any false
material statement or representation in any application,
label, manifest, record, report, permit or other document
filed, maintained or used for purposes of compliance with
regulations promulgated by the Administrator (or by a
State in the case of an authorized State program) under
this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3)(1983). Appellant contends that his con-
viction cannot be sustained because the legislative history
supports the position that § 6928(d)(3) was not intended to
cover the events that occurred in the present case.
The legislative history lends insight into Congressional
intentions when it drafted the criminal provisions of §
6928(d)(3). It provides in relevant part:
This section also provides for criminal penalties for the
person who knowingly transports any hazardous waste
listed under this title to a facility which does not have a
permit issued pursuant to section 305, or disposes of any
hazardous waste without a permit under this title, or
makes any false statement or representation in any appli-
cation,, label, manifest, report or permit filed to comply
with this title. H.R. Rep. No. 94-580, 94th Cong., 2nd
Sess., pt. 1 at 31 (1976).
This section of the legislative history suggests that the intent
of Congress was to prosecute any person illegally transporting
hazardous wastes, thereby reducing the amount of hazardous
wastes that are unlawfully disposed of.
The fact that the provision for false statements is dealt
with in the same sentence as the requirement of permits for
dumping and transporting wastes suggests that the false state-
ment must be made in regard to the waste that is being ille-
gally transported or dumped. The statute mandates that a
person be criminally prosecuted for making false statements
in any "application, label, manifest, record, report, permit or
1991]
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other document" that is needed in order to transport or dump
hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (3) (1983). Therefore,
someone who knowingly gave false information in order to ob-
tain a permit could be criminally liable under this statute. To
the contrary, this statute cannot be used to prosecute appel-
lant Canner because the events that occurred do not involve
the sort of conduct that Congress sought to prevent when it
enacted § 6928(d)(3).
The government argues that Adams made false state-
ments to Durden during a phone conversation. The govern-
ment further contends that the phone conversation consti-
tutes a "report" within the meaning of the statute. According
to the legislative history, however, this "report" does not fall
within the meaning of the statute. The facts of the case show
that the Omni truck was legally transporting wastes to a re-
cycler when the alleged spill occurred; there is no issue with
respect to Omni's permit to dispose of the waste. No problem
has arisen regarding false information given on an application,
label, manifest, etc. that was utilized for the purpose of trans-
porting hazardous wastes. The only incident that occurred
was an EPA inspector talking to an Omni employee over the
phone regarding a spill that occurred outside the gates of the
Omni plant. Appellant asserts that he cannot be held liable
under § 6928(d)(3) because his employee's telephone conver-
sation with an E.P.A. official is not a "report" within §
6928(d)(3).
II. CANNER CANNOT BE CONVICTED UNDER SEC-
TION 6928(D)(3) BECAUSE HIS ACTIONS DID NOT
CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE.
The first requirement of the statute is that appellant
must "knowingly" omit material information or make any
false material statements or representation." 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(3) (1983). The government contends that a false
statement was made by Arnold Adams during a phone conver-
sation with Inspector Durden. Appellant Canner, therefore,
cannot be convicted under this element of the statute because
he did not participate in the phone conversation between Ad-
[Vol. 8
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ams and Durden. As the record points out the letter that was
the basis for the phone call never reached Mr. Canner person-
ally. Pursuant to Canner's standing instructions, all corre-
spondences concerning the plant's environmental compliance,
occupational safety and health compliance are routed to Ber-
nard Barker, the plant manager (R. 3). Since Canner did not
make any false statement and was not even aware that an In-
spector from the EPA was looking into a possible DWE spill
by an Omni truck, he does not meet the "knowingly" element
of the statute and therefore cannot be convicted under it.
III. EVEN IF THE COURT DECIDES TO EXTEND
CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO APPELLANT CANNER,
HE CANNOT BE CONVICTED BECAUSE HIS EM-
PLOYEES' ACTIONS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A VI-
OLATION OF SECTION 6928(D)(3).
A. No False Statement Was Made by Adams During
His Phone Conversation With Inspector Durden.
If the court decides to prosecute Canner because he is the
president of the corporation, he nevertheless may not be con-
victed under § 6928(d)(3) because Adams did not knowingly
make a false statement to Inspector Durden during their
phone conversation. Therefore, Adams' actions did not fulfill
the first element of the statute.
The record notes that a truckload of DWE did leave the
plant in late June and was taken to a nearby recycler (R.2).
On June 26, 1989, Edward Egger, a New Union City police-
man, noticed an Omni truck leave the plant. He saw the truck
pull off the road and noticed it was leaking a yellow liquid
onto the grass. Officer Egger never pursued this incident (R.
2). Therefore, when Adams spoke to Inspector Durden he did
not know about the incident that Officer Egger had observed.
Furthermore, Adams did not know if the leaking truck or an-
other truck had carried the DWE. Of relevance here is the
fact that the DWE was not discovered on the Omni truck un-
til after Adams phoned Inspector Durden. Also noteworthy is
the fact that no driver had reported a spill, and that DWE is
transported by other trucks that pass by Omni's front gates
1991]
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(R.3). All these facts support the conclusion that when Adams
told Durden "we do not know the source of the spill," he was
not "knowingly omitting material information or making any
false material statement or representation." 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(3) (1983). The statement he made to Durden was lit-
erally true for he had no conclusive facts to share with her.
Therefore, Adams' actions did not satisfy the first element of
the statute.
B. If The Court Rules That Adams Did Knowingly
Make a False Statement, Appellant Cannot be
Convicted Because Adams' Phone Call to Durden
Does Not Constitute a "Report" Within the Mean-
ing of the Statute.
Appellant next asserts that even if Adams did knowingly
make a false statement, he did not do so in "any application,
label, manifest, record, report, permit or other document." 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) (1983). The lower court ruled, however,
that Adams' phone call was a "report" to Durden. The court
reasoned that because Congress finished its examples by in-
cluding "or other documents" it must have mentioned this
phrase "as an admittedly inartful way to broaden what is cov-
ered, not to limit it" (R.5).
Appellant relies on a rule of statutory construction known
as noscitur a sociis to point out that the District Court's rul-
ing with respect to Mr. Canner is erroneous. Black's Law Dic-
tionary defines noscitur a sociis as a rule which allows the
meaning of a word to be known from the accompanying
words. Black's Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed., 1990). Under
this doctrine the meaning of questionable or doubtful words
or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the
meaning of other words or phrases associated with it. Statutes
and Statutory Construction further states that where the
meaning of a word is unclear in one part of a statute but clear
in another part, the clear meaning can be imparted to the un-
clear usage on the assumption that it means the same thing
throughout the statute. Sutherland, Statutory Const., section
47.16 (4th ed. 1984). Appellant Canner contends that the
[Vol. 8
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meaning of the word "report" is unclear in the statute because
report could be construed as an oral statement or a written
statement. Mr. Canner asserts that "report" should be inter-
preted as a written statement.
Appellant relies on the definitions set forth in Black's
Law Dictionary of the words "application," "label," "mani-
fest," "record," "report," "permit" and "document." Black's
Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). An application is defined as
"an appeal or petition, especially as written." Id. at 98-99. A
label is "anything appended to a larger writing." Id. at 874.
Manifest is defined as "evident to the senses, especially the
sight;" it is also a "document used in shipping. . . containing
a list of the contents." Id. at 962. A record is "the act or fact
of recording or being recorded, reducing to writing as evi-
dence." Id. at 1273. Permit is defined as "a written license or
warrant. . .: Id. at 1140. A document is "an instrument on
which is recorded, by means of letters, figures or marks, the
original, official or legal form of something." Id. at 481.
The definitions of the above stated terms suggest that
Congress intended to prosecute only those persons making a
false written statement. The statute does not appear to cover
those individuals giving false oral statements, because all of
the words surrounding "report" imply that something must be
written in order to come within the meaning of the definition.
Appellant's argument is further supported by the addi-
tion of the phrase "or other document." 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(3) (1983). The lower court felt that this phrase broad-
ened the terms of the statute. Appellant, however, urges that
it serves to narrow the meaning of the statute. As defined
above by Black's Law Dictionary, a document is clearly a
written instrument. This is further supported by the defini-
tion in the Random House Dictionary, which states that a
document is "a written or printed paper furnishing informa-
tion or evidence: and further defines it as "any written item."
Random House Dictionary 578 (2nd ed., 1987). Nothing in the
definition of the word suggests that it can be oral. Therefore,
by using the phrase "or other document" Congress narrowed
the terms of the statute because a document must be a writ-
ten instrument.
1991]
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The word "report" in the statute should be construed to
mean a written statement. This is supported by the doctrine
of noscitur a sociis and the addition of the words "or other
documents" which serve to narrow the meaning of the statute.
Accordingly, Adams' oral telephone conversation with Durden
would not fall within the meaning of the statute.
C. Assuming the Court Rules That the First Two Ele-
ments of the Statute are Met, Appellant Cannot be
Convicted Because Nothing was Filed, Maintained
or Used for Purposes of Compliance with Regula-
tions Promulgated by the Administrator.
Mr. Canner further contends that the subject matter of
Durden's letter and Adams' response is not covered by §
6928(d)(3) because the false information must be "filed, main-
tained or used for purposes of compliance with regulations
promulgated . . . under this subtitle."42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(3)(1983). Appellant notes that Durden's letter made
no reference to any regulatory purpose and did not even spec-
ify the reason for which the EPA wanted the information (R.
3). The lower court improperly stated that it was enough that
the EPA wanted the information for its environmental pro-
grams (R. 5).
The district judge ignored the language of the statute
when making its decision. The statute clearly states that the
false information must be "filed, maintained or used for pur-
poses of compliance with regulations promulgated by the Ad-
ministrator." 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) (1983). Congress specifi-
cally included this language into the statute. Consequently,
the courts are not at liberty to disregard the language of the
statute. It therefore follows that this Court is obligated to re-
verse Mr. Canner's conviction because the subject matter of
the letter and Adams' response is not covered by the statute.
[Vol. 8
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IV. APPELLANT CANNER'S CONVICTION DEMANDS
REVERSAL BECAUSE HE DID NOT POSSESS THE
REQUISITE KNOWLEDGE AS IS DEMANDED BY
THE STATUTE.
Mr. Charles Canner's criminal conviction is clearly erro-
neous and requires reversal because the Government failed to
adequately demonstrate that Mr. Canner personally retained
knowledge of the alleged violation. Section 6928(d)(3) of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act expressly states that
a person charged with violating the statute must "knowingly"
engage in conduct sufficient to breach the statute. 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(3) (1983). An individual may be said to have acted
with knowledge "when he is aware or believes that the unlaw-
ful result is practically certain to result from his act or omis-
sion." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 445 (1978). The record is devoid of any evidence sug-
gesting Mr. Canner acted or failed to act so as to "knowingly"
circumvent the language of any environmental statute. Ac-
cordingly, Mr. Canner's conviction must be vacated because
the Government did not, and can not, prove Mr. Canner
"knowingly" violated § 6928(d)(3).
A. Analogous Criminal Proceedings Illustrate that an
Individual's Knowledge Must be Proven Before a
Conviction May be Properly Found.
Several germane cases manifest the traditional concept
that criminal statutes containing a mens rea element com-
mand that the particular element be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. Although considered public welfare statutes, it is
nonetheless clear that most environmental statutes do not en-
tail strict liability; rather, a predominance of the laws require
knowledge or some alternative mode of volitional conduct. See
generally Reisel, Criminal Prosecutions and Defense of Envi-
ronmental Wrongs, 15 E.L.R. 10065 (1985) (stating, inter alia,
that penal environmental statutes are not strict liability
crimes.)
In a case involving illicit roadside dumping, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit acknowledged
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that a defendant charged with violating the Toxic Waste Sub-
stance Control Act must be proven to have breached the stat-
ute's mental element. United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982). In Ward,
the defendant was convicted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605,
2614 for discharging PCB laden transformer oil along county
roadways. Id. at 95. While defendant Ward did not personally
participate in the dumping, the Court found that since he
knew of the activity and yet failed to put a stop to it, Ward's
guilt paralleled that of the actual violator. Id. at 96.
Whereas Ward was correctly reprimanded for his con-
duct, the same cannot be said with respect to Mr. Canner's
situation. Ward cogently displays the fact that each particular
defendant must be proven to have maintained a mental state
sufficient to violate the statute at bar. The fact that an em-
ployee of Mr. Ward's, or conversely, Mr. Canner's plant man-
ager, knew of the illegal activity is plainly not enough to sus-
tain the employer's conviction.
Further noteworthy case law demonstrates that the mere
fact that Charles Canner acted as Omni's president does not
warrant placing criminal liability upon him. In United States
v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., the Third Circuit held that when deter-
mining criminal liability for alleged environmental crimes
every defendant must be proven to have possessed the crimi-
nal mind adequate to support the conviction. United States v.
Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). Similarly, the United States Su-
preme Court has stated when a defendant is charged with vio-
lating a statute containing the element "knowing", the de-
fendant must at least be proven to have ascertained the facts
surrounding the act upon which the charge is founded. United
States v. International Minerals and Chemical Corp., 402
U.S. 558, 563 (1970).
There is not a single hint of evidence in the record which
even remotely suggests Mr. Canner knew of any Omni vehicle
leaking any substance. Indeed, it was Omni's policy to direct
such matters into the hands of those most capable of handling
these problems (R. 4). Thus, Mr. Canner did not know, nor
did he have any reason to know of the E.P.A. inquiry in ques-
[13]
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tion. Consequently, since neither the pertinent case law nor
the factual background of this case supports the district
court's ruling, Charles Canner's conviction must be reversed.
B. Courts Have Strictly Adhered to the "Knowingly"
Standard Found in Other Section 6928(d)
Subsections.
Reported interpretations of the various subsections of §
6928(d) indicate that courts rigidly conform to the "know-
ingly" element found in this statute. These decisions, albeit
not binding, provide this Court with persuasive evidence of
Mr. Canner's innocence. Therefore, to uphold Mr. Canner's
conviction would not only be unjust, but would directly con-
tradict the very decisions other courts, administrative agen-
cies and corporations must rely on in attempting to enforce
and comply with this environmental law.
Subsections (1) and (2)(A) of § 6928(d) both enlist the
element "knowingly" in their efforts to enforce environmental
compliance. In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. the
Third Circuit, when interpreting subsection (2)(A), held that
the Government was required to prove the defendant pos-
sessed knowledge of the illegal action taken. United States v.
Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). The Johnson court stressed that
individual criminal liability, irrespective of the sanctions
placed on the corporate entity itself, must be predicated upon
knowledge of the facts constituting the crime. Id. at 669.
Thus, criminal liability could not extend to a corporate officer
or employee absent proof that the individual defendant knew
of all the facts upon which the charge was based.
Two years subsequent to the Johnson opinion, the Elev-
enth Circuit interpreted subsection (1) of § 6928(d) as being
virtually identical to subsection (2)(A). The Court held that
although a defendant did not have to be aware of the particu-
lar law allegedly broken, the defendant must be shown to have
knowledge of the facts which made his or her conduct illegal.
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1986); See also United States v. Protex Industries, 874
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F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989) (interpreting the knowing endanger-
ment requirement of § 6928 (e)). Hayes concludes by adding
that "removing the knowing requirement from the elements
would criminalize innocent conduct." Id. at 1504.
After considering the preceding authorities and their rele-
vance with regard to § 6928(d)(3), the fact that Charles Can-
ner had no knowledge of either the leaking vehicle or the
E.P.A. inquiry potently militates for a reversal of his convic-
tion. The questionable findings of the district court are en-
tirely inconsistent with the statutory language and case law.
In effect, the district court's opinion does exactly what Hayes
warns against. It "criminalizes" inculpable behavior.
C. Section 6928(d) is not a Strict Liability Statute.
Any assertion that the case before this Court warrants the
imposition of strict liability is unsound and erroneous. The
charges against Charles Canner do not resemble an action
brought pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA
is utilized to recover response costs in civil proceedings. 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1980). Additionally, CERCLA is essen-
tially a strict liability statute. See State of New York v. Shore
Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). Consequently, any envi-
ronmental suit under CERCLA cannot be compared, in any
meaningful fashion, to the present case as § 6928(d)(3) of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act involves criminal
sanctions founded upon individual knowledge. 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(3), United States v. Interstate Engineering Corp.,
288 F.Supp. 402 (D.N.H. 1967).
There are a number of civil cases upon which the Govern-
ment may contend that corporate officers may be held liable
for environmental harms caused by their corporation. See
generally United States v. Conservation Chemical Corp of
Ill., 660 F.Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (corporate president
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), a civil offense); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.,
Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987) (imposing liability on a corporate officer in a civil ac-
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tion); State of New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1985) (corporate president liable for CERCLA response
costs); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.Supp. 898 (D.N.H.
1985) (civil action under CERCLA); United States v. Ward,
618 F.Supp. 884 (D.N.C. 1985) (unlike criminal segment, in
civil portion of the case defendant may be held strictly liable).
But see Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James and Co., Inc., 696 F.Supp.
222 (W.D. La. 1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (court
would not pierce corporate veil absent a specific Congressional
directive); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526
F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Moretti, 526 F.2d
1306 (5th Cir. 1976).
Mr. Canner does not take issue with the general validity
of these authorities. Rather, he refers to these authorities so
as to direct the Court's attention to the fact that they are
completely inapplicable to his case. Hence, any argument
seeking to premise criminal liability upon the cases recited
above, or those of a similar character, must be rejected as ir-
relevant and misleading.
The present case is similarly distinguishable from crimi-
nal actions based on the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act because that statute also imposes strict liability upon its
offenders. The United States Supreme Court has held that the
aforementioned Act's successful enforcement does not hinge
on proof of a defendant corporate official's mens rea. United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). In these cases, corporate officers
were convicted not on the basis of their knowledge, but solely
by virtue of their corporate position and relation to the prob-
lem involved. Nothing in the language of § 6928(d)(3) sup-
ports such a result with respect to Mr. Canner. Again, it is
clear that § 6928(d)(3) requires that an alleged offender
"knowingly" engage in illegal conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3)
(1983). The Government has failed to carry its burden of
proving Mr. Canner's knowledge. Accordingly, the "strict lia-
bility" forced upon Appellant should be vacated as violative
of § 6928(d)(3), Mr. Canner's rights, and conventional con-
cepts of criminal liability.
[16
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V. CHARLES CANNER'S POSITION AS OMNI'S PRESI-
DENT IS NOT A BASIS UPON WHICH KNOWL-
EDGE MAY BE IMPUTED.
Criminal liability may not be extended to Mr.Canner pur-
suant to § 6928(d)(3) simply because his corporate office
placed him in a position where he could have known of the
E.P.A. investigation. Generally, American courts have refused
to impute an employee' knowledge to a corporate officer when
the criminal statute provides a mens rea element. Gordon v.
United States, 347 U.S. 909, 910 (1954). The fact that Barker
or Adams knew of the investigation, therefore, cannot sustain
Charles Canner's conviction when Mr. Canner did not, to any
degree, share his employees' knowledge. The doctrine of the
responsible corporate officer finds no refuge in a non-strict lia-
bility,. criminal atmosphere and cannot be implemented to up-
hold Mr. Canner's conviction.
A. Omni's Policy with Respect to Environmental Laws
is Properly Structured for Producing Prompt and
Efficient Response Measures.
Due to the various demands made upon Omni's successful
corporate president, Mr. Canner, authority to deal with envi-
ronmental issues was appropriately delegated to Barker,
Omni's plant manager (R. 3). The corporate policy is designed
to promote fleet action rather than bureaucratic sluggishness.
The consent of Charles Canner was not required to direct ad-
herence to environmental laws. Instead, this one additional
step, one fraught with possible delays, was eliminated in favor
of placing corporate environmental compliance in the compe-
tent hands of an experienced, well trained manager (R. 3).
The Government's assertion that Mr. Canner intention-
ally ignored certain issues such as environmental compliance
in order to avoid personal liability is factually suspect. As was
noted above, Omni's policy was to directly deal with, not leave
unaddressed, environmental complaints (R. 3). Furthermore,
there is no indication of any prior environmental problems
Mr. Canner would possess a motive to stay isolated from.
Omni Corp. has been a immense social and economic benefit
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to New Union City. It's president should not be forced to in-
cur the consequences of any employee ineptitude if and when
longstanding corporate practices are not adhered to.
The common law doctrine of deliberate ignorance is
equally remote in terms of reaching Mr. Canner's position be-
cause there is no evidence in the record which insinuates
Charles Canner consciously removed himself from a presently
existing problem. In a recent Court of Appeals decision, the
Ninth Circuit held that a jury instruction of deliberate igno-
rance is correctly given only in extremely narrow circum-
stances. United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768
F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1985). The Pacific Hide court held that
the defendant's failure to receive notice of the alleged viola-
tion, coupled with a general lack of knowledge regarding the
situation, did not sustain the Government's argument that the
defendant purposely avoided learning the truth. Id. at 1098.
Hence, the Pacific Hide opinion strongly advises that the de-
fendant in question must, at the very least, have some indica-
tion that there is an existing problem in order for the court to
instruct the jury on the doctrine of deliberate ignorance.
The record does not reflect, under any reading, the notion
that Mr. Canner knew of or purposely avoided knowing of the
E.P.A.'s inquiry of August 1989 (R. 3). Additionally, it is illog-
ical to surmise that one may deliberately ignore a problem
that the individual knew nothing about. Omni's policy of for-
warding environmental matters directly to Barker was not an
evasion by Mr. Canner of present difficulties. Rather, it is a
prudently developed plan that applies to several situations
without regard to the timing or severity of the problem at
hand. Applying the doctrine of deliberate ignorance in the
present situation is tantamount to holding that corporate of-
ficers may never delegate authority in any capacity. Such a
result would hardly benefit the efficiency and productivity of
American industry.
Additional case law augments the contention that Charles
Canner did not purposely avoid learning of the E.P.A.'s inves-
tigation. If direct knowledge is not discovered, a charge of de-
liberate ignorance is warranted only where the jury could find
that there are facts present to suggest a pattern of behavior
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based upon knowledge of action sufficient to violate the law.
United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632 (1st Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1038 (1980); See also United States v.
Deveau, 734 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1158 (1985); United States v. Corbin Farm Service, 444
F.Supp. 510 (E.D. Ca. 1978).
Imported to the present situation, Ciampaglia would only
support the imposition of the doctrine of deliberate ignorance
upon Mr. Canner if there were facts indicating he was pur-
posely evading a problem he knew of, yet sought to avoid by
having his conduct evince an unawareness of the situation.
There are, however, no facts suggesting Mr. Canner knew of
the E.P.A.'s investigation. It therefore rationally follows that
he could not have been consciously avoiding an existing prob-
lem of which he had no consciousness of. The doctrine of de-
liberate ignorance should not be applied by this Court as it
can only serve to prejudice Mr. Canner's case.
B. Congress Did Not Intend Section 6928(d) to Reach
Corporate Officers Not Possessing Knowledge of a
Violation.
Congress did not intend for criminal liability to extend to
corporate officers under § 6928(d) because the language "re-
sponsible corporate officer" was not included within the stat-
ute. In similar environmental laws, Congress expressly pro-
vided that the term "person" shall specifically embrace any
"responsible corporate officer." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (1986);
42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3) (1983). Under these enumerated stat-
utes, Congress directed for the implication of criminal liability
upon any corporate official whose duties bore a reasonable re-
lation to the alleged violation.
Thus, if a corporate manager could have prevented a
problem in his or her department, that individual might be
found liable by virtue of his or her association with that area
of the corporation. This enforcement contingency is not al-
lowed for in the present case. The legislative history of §
6928(d)(3) does not illuminate why "responsible corporate of-
ficer" was expressly excepted. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491, 94th
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Cong., 2nd Sess., pt.1, at 30 (1976). Nevertheless, courts must
not legislate in an area where Congress has refused to do so.
Penal sanctions should not be impressed upon Charles Canner
where Congress has not explicitly provided for such a result.
To do so would frustrate the intent of Congress and would be
an abuse of power by this Court.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY WILL NOT BE FURTHERED BY
PLACING THE STIGMA OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
ON AN EXEMPLARY CIVIC LEADER.
Criminally reprimanding and disgracing Charles Canner
will not benefit the goals of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act or the community of New Union City. The
Omni corporation has been an impeccable asset to its sur-
roundings, employing hundreds of workers formerly unem-
ployed, increasing local property values, and generally con-
tributing to the decrease in the local crime rate (R. 1). Charles
Canner, president and chief developer of Omni, is an active
and important public figure. A member of the Board of Direc-
tors of New Union City General Hospital and the chairman of
the New Union City Council on Fine Arts, Mr. Canner main-
tains an unblemished personal and business reputation. Given
these facts, there is simply no valid purpose for enforcing a
minor violation upon Mr. Canner, particularly when the liabil-
ity is, at best, very dubious.
Appellant is not contending that the legitimacy and via-
bility of environmental statutes should be sacrificed in favor
of preserving reputations and civic accomplishments. How-
ever, Mr. Canner emphatically urges this Court to weigh heav-
ily the fact that criminal sanctions would publicly embarrass
and destroy all of his personal and business credentials de-
servedly earned. Mr. Canner properly directed environmental
problems in the hands of those he felt most able to address
these issues (R. 3). Thus, any proven violation should not be
forced on him because of his appropriate delegation of author-
ity. In a period of national corporate regression and economic
stagnation, this Court must not punish an innovative leader
whose business supports the life of a community. The threat
1991]
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of a criminal stigma in Charles Canner's case serves only to
quash a creative business personality upon whom the vitality
of Omni corporation rests.
Environmental criminal enforcement policies must not be
directed at pursuing petty, insignificant violations that arise
due to simple errors rather than conscious non-compliance.
The primary focus of environmental enforcement should be
the intentional and continuous offenders who significantly vio-
late environmental statutes. See Olds, Thoughts on the Role
of Penalties in the Enforcement of the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts, 17 Duq. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1978-1979). Furthermore,
enforcement officials have recommended that "prosecution of
individual corporate officers should only be pursued where the
evidence demonstrates that intentional corporate non-compli-
ance with the law is the result of an informed policy decision
made by some corporate official." Id. at 27, (quoting from 8
Envir. Rep. 247, 248 (1977)). The case before this Court
scarcely reflects any such substantial, continuous, or inten-
tional disregard of any environmental statute.
The time and expense of both the E.P.A. and environ-
mentally conscious companies such as Omni can be better ex-
pended through non-adversarial, candid communications
rather than in heated court battles. After considering this and
the many preceding arguments, this Court must reverse
Charles Canner's conviction. The interests of New Union City,
the E.P.A., and Mr. Canner are better served by not enforcing
criminal sanctions upon the appellant. His conduct is not
criminal, and therefore not the sort of activity which this
Court should punish. This is clear after considering all the
facts, authorities, and policies which warrant a reversal of the
district court's judgment.
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VII. ASSUMING THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED
A VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. SECTION 6928(D)(3),
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT ONLY AGAINST
MR. BARKER.
A. The Evidence Unequivocally Demonstrates that
Only Mr. Barker Possessed the Requisite Level of
"Knowledge" Under the Statute.
Defendants act knowingly if they are aware "that the re-
sult is practically certain to follow from ... [their] conduct"
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 445 (quoting W.
LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law, 196 (1972)). The "result"
Messrs. Canner and Barker were held liable for was the alleg-
edly false statement (R. 5). Mr. Canner's only "conduct" is
delegating environmental compliance to Mr. Barker. Conse-
quently, for Mr. Canner's conviction to stand, the evidence
must demonstrate that the allegedly false statement is practi-
cally certain to follow from Mr. Canner's delegation of respon-
sibility for environmental matters to Mr. Barker.
Evidence of prior violations is a powerful rejoinder to the
defense "'that the act on trial was . . . inadvertent, acciden-
tal, unintentional, or without guilty knowledge.'" United
States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1963) (quoting McCor-
mick, Evidence, at 329 (1954)). There is no evidence demon-
strating that Mr. Canner was not aware that false statements
or even violations of environmental laws in general would be
practically certain to follow from his policy of delegating re-
sponsibility for environmental compliance to Mr. Barker.
Moreover, it is a non sequitur to conclude that Mr. Can-
ner is liable under § 6928(d)(3) for knowingly making a false
statement or knowingly failing to prevent a false statement
from being made, because knowledge of the EPA investigation
could be imputed to Mr. Canner through Mr. Formes. There
is no evidence to provide a logical link between the two
events. The Government has not shown that Mr. Canner had
no reason to believe Mr. Barker would not carry out his duty
of ensuring that the company and its employees operated
within the parameters of the environmental laws. The absence
of this or other similarly competent evidence establishes that
[22]
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Mr. Canner could not have acted "knowingly."
Although the evidence is insufficient to establish that Mr.
Canner possessed the requisite level of culpable knowledge,
the evidence is sufficient to conclude that Mr. Barker acted
knowingly. Mr. Barker was aware that the comments Mr. Ad-
ams made to Inspector Durden of the EPA were practically
certain to follow from his conversation with Mr. Adams.
Barker induced Adams to rely on Barker's superior
knowledge and experience by telling Adams, "You're new to
this business, and I'll give you some advice In this case we
don't know anything for certain Now, I want you to call the
EPA to answer the letter. Be careful what you say. Don't lie,
but don't volunteer anything either. Say as little as possible"
(R. 4). Adams called Inspector Durden and told her, "we don't
know the source of the spill" (R. 4). By inducing Adams to
rely on his superior position in the company, expertise and
authority, Barker must have been aware that Adams' state-
ment to Inspector Durden would be practically certain to fol-
low from his "advice."
Viewing the record as a whole, the evidence is sufficient
to establish Mr. Barker acted "knowingly." Consequently, Mr.
Barker's conviction may be upheld. However, there is no evi-
dence that Mr. Canner knew or should have known about the
allegedly false statement, or that he could not rely on his sys-
tem of delegating authority for compliance with environmen-
tal laws to Mr. Barker. Consequently, the district court com-
mitted reversible error in denying Mr. Canner's motion for
acquittal.
B. The Evidence Unequivocally Demonstrates that Any
Alleged Violation of the Statute Was "Effectively
Caused" by Mr. Barker.
A person may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A)
for knowingly causing others to dispose of hazardous waste in
violation of RCRA's permit requirements. United States v.
Greer, 850 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1988). In Greer, there was no
direct evidence that Mr. Greer ordered his subordinate to dis-
pose of the waste in violation of § 6928(d)(2)(A). Id. at 1451.
[23]
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However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the evidence at trial
was sufficient for the jury to infer that Mr. Greer effectively
caused his subordinate to dispose of hazardous waste improp-
erly. Id. at 1452. Similarly, there is no direct evidence that
Mr. Barker told Mr. Adams what to say. However, the evi-
dence is sufficient to infer that Mr. Barker effectively caused
Mr. Adams to make the false statement.
Arthur J. Greer operated a waste transportation and re-
cycling business in Orlando, Florida. Edward L. Fountain was
Greer's plant manager and subordinate at the time of the ille-
gal activity. At trial, Fountain testified that he once ques-
tioned Mr. Greer's wisdom about improperly dumping what
Fountain thought was a particularly noxious load of waste
onto the ground. Greer's reaction was to say, "'I never had
any problem out of [former plant managers]. Do I see a prob-
lem out of you?'" Id. at 1451.
On or about August 12, 1982, the date of the incident
leading to Greer's indictment, a 1000 gallon truck was driven
to Greer's facility. Greer told Fountain that the truck was
needed the following day. There were no storage tanks availa-
ble to unload the waste into. Fountain informed Greer of this
fact. Greer responded by asking Fountain if he was having an-
other problem, adding that he hired Fountain to handle these
types of situations. Fountain resolved his dilemma by dump-
ing the 1000 gallons of waste onto the ground. The Eleventh
Circuit found this evidence sufficient to establish that Greer
effectively caused Fountain to dump the waste onto the
ground in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). Id. at 1451-
1452. Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit did not imply the re-
sponsible corporate officer doctrine into the statute to hold
Mr. Greer liable.
As in Greer, this court need not engage in judicial legisla-
tion and imply the responsible corporate officer doctrine into
the statute to hold the truly responsible party liable for the
alleged violation. Rather, this court can use Greer to place the
blame where it properly belongs - on Mr. Barker, the man
who "effectively caused" any alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(3).
Mr. Barker supervised the entire workforce at Omni's
[24]
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New Union facility (R. 2). Consequently, Barker was Adams'
superior. The conversation that occurred between Barker and
Adams before Adams called Inspector Durden is swollen with
the implication that Adams should rely on Barker's superior
position in the company, knowledge and experience and take
his "advice" (R. 4).
The evidence unequivocally demonstrates that Adams re-
lied on Barker's superior position in the company, knowledge
and expertise, and took Barker's "advice." Barker told Ad-
ams, "You're new to this business, and I'll give you some ad-
vice In this case we don't know anything for certain Now, I
want you to call EPA Be careful what you say. Don't lie, but
don't volunteer anything either. Say as little possible" (R. 4).
Thereafter, Adams called Inspector Durden and told her, "we
do not know the source of the spill" (R. 4). Adams was merely
passing on the substance of his conversation with Barker.
Consequently, any violation of § 6928(d)(3) was effectively
caused by Barker inducing Adams to rely on Barker's
"advice."
Similarly, Arthur Greer was Edward Fountain's superior.
The conversation between Greer and Fountain before Foun-
tain dumped the 1000 gallons of waste onto the ground is
swollen with the implication that if Fountain did not comply
with Greer's wishes, Greer would find someone else to do the
job. Essentially, Greer coerced Fountain into performing the
illegal act by threatening Fountain's position at the company.
Although Barker did not overtly coerce Adams, he offered Ad-
ams some "advice" based on Barker's superior position in the
company, knowledge and expertise. As the record demon-
strates, Adams took Barker's advice (R. 4). Therefore, by in-
ducing Adams to rely on his "advice," Barker effectively
caused any alleged violation as surely as Greer effectively
caused Fountain to dump the 1000 gallons of waste onto the
ground. Moreover, Adams subsequently reported his conversa-
tion with Inspector Durden to Mr. Barker, who nodded in ap-
proval (R. 4). Consequently, Barker not only effectively
caused but also failed to remedy any alleged wrongdoing, an
act for which he can be held liable. Comment, The Criminal
Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution of the En-
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vironment, 37 Alb. L. Rev. 61, 70 (1972).
There is no evidence that Mr. Canner "effectively caused"
the alleged violation. Unlike Mr. Greer or Mr. Barker, Mr.
Canner did not exercise any affirmative influence on anyone.
Mr. Canner did not coerce or induce anyone to rely on his
representations. If Mr. Canner directed Barker or any other
subordinate to perform the allegedly illegal act, there would
be a basis for holding Mr. Canner liable. Id. Similarly, if Mr.
Canner knew of the allegedly illegal conduct but failed to
remedy it, he could be held criminally liable. Id. However,
there is no evidence establishing that Mr. Canner knew of the
alleged violation yet failed to act. Moreover, there is no evi-
dence suggesting that Mr. Canner knew or should have known
that he could not rely on his policy of delegating environmen-
tal compliance to Mr. Barker. Finally, there is no evidence
that Mr. Canner coerced or induced Mr. Adams into making
the allegedly false statement. Consequently, Mr. Canner can-
not be held to have "effectively caused" the violation.
VIII. ASSUMING THIS COURT IMPLIES THE RE-
SPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
INTO SECTION 6928(D)(3), AGAIN, THE FACTS
DEMONSTRATE THAT ONLY MR. BARKER IS
LIABLE.
A. The Court Cannot Use the Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine to Erase From the Statute the Re-
quirement that Defendants Act "Knowingly."
The responsible corporate officer doctrine imposes liabil-
ity on corporate officials "who. . .have a responsible share in
... further[ing] . . . the transaction which the statute out-
laws." United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943);
See also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 669 (1975)
(quoting Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284). Dotterweich and Park
are the leading Supreme Court cases applying the responsible
corporate officer doctrine. However, as previously indicated,
Dotterweich and Park are not relevant because they both ap-
plied a strict liability standard. Messrs. Canner and Barker
were charged under a statute requiring violators to act "know-
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ingly." As also indicated, courts strictly adhere to the "knowl-
edge" requirement in cases proceeding under 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d). Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); and Hayes Int'l Corp., 786
F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1986). Consequently, if this court implies
the responsible corporate officer doctrine into the statute, the
government still must prove that Messrs. Canner and Barker
acted "knowingly." This conclusion is supported by Dot-
terweich and Park.
Justice Frankfurter in Dotterweich noted that the act
under which the defendant was prosecuted dispensed with the
traditional element of mens rea. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-
281. See also Park, 421 U.S. at 670-671. Consequently, the
court felt justified in construing the statute liberally. Dot-
terweich, 320 U.S. at 280-281; Park, 421 U.S. at 670-671. The
Court in Park also noted that an amendment to the statute
imposing liability for willful or grossly negligent acts was
"subsequently stricken in conference." Park, 421 U.S. at 672
n. 15 (citing 94 Cong. Rec. 8551, 8838 (1948)). Moreover, Chief
Justice Burger in Park wrote that Dotterweich left the prob-
lem of determining who stands in a responsible relation to the
company up to "settled doctrines of criminal law." Settled
doctrines of criminal law do not include modifying a congres-
sionally established level of mens rea in the statute. Gordon,
347 U.S. at 909-910. Finally, the commentators considering
the issue agree that the "knowingly" requirement cannot be
read out of the statute when a court applies the responsible
corporate officer doctrine. Olds, Unkovic & Levin, Thoughts
on the Role of Penalties in the Enforcement of the Clean Air
and Water Acts, 17 Duq. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1977-1978); Comment,
The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollu-
tion of the Environment, 37 Alb. L. Rev. 61, 74 (1972). Conse-
quently, if this Court implies the responsible corporate officer
doctrine into the statute, the evidence must be sufficient to
conclude that Messrs. Canner and Barker possessed the requi-
site level of knowledge under the statute.
To reiterate, there is no evidence that Mr. Canner was
aware that the false statement or violations of environmental
laws were practically certain to result from his policy of dele-
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gating responsibility for environmental compliance to Mr.
Barker, or from the fact that Frank Formes knew that the
EPA was investigating a spill outside the gate of Omni's New
Union City plant. The evidence is sufficient, however, to es-
tablish that Mr. Barker was aware that Mr. Adams' statement
to Inspector Durden was practically certain to follow from Mr.
Barker's conduct. Mr. Barker used his superior position in the
company, expertise and knowledge to impart some "advice" to
Mr. Adams. The record demonstrates that Adams took that
advice. Moreover, Barker effectively caused the violation by
inducing Adams to rely on Barker's superior position, exper-
tise and knowledge. Finally, Mr. Barker failed to remedy any
wrongdoing after Adams reported the conversation with In-
spector Durden to him. The evidence conclusively establishes
that only Mr. Mr. Barker possessed the requisite level of
knowledge.
B. What the Government Must Prove if the Responsi-
ble Corporate Officer Doctrine is Implied into Sec-
tion 6928(d) (3).
The Government establishes a prima facie case
against responsible corporate officials when it introduces
evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the
facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in
the corporation, responsibility and authority either to
prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the
violation complained of, and that he failed to do so. The
failure to fulfill the duty imposed by the interaction of
the corporate agent's authority and the statute furnishes
the causal link.
Park, 421 U.S. at 673-674. Consequently, the nexus between
the responsible corporate officer doctrine and liability under
the statute is duty and breach of duty. Therefore, liability for
Messrs. Canner and Barker depends on the scope of the duty.
Responsible corporate officers must exercise a "demand-
ing level" of "foresight and vigilance." Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
The demanding level of foresight and vigilance must be exer-
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cised "either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to
correct the violation complained of' Id. at 674. Therefore,
when the statute provides for strict liability, the responsible
corporate officer is under a duty to exercise a demanding level
of foresight and vigilance to prevent violations of environmen-
tal laws. However, § 6928(d)(3) is not a strict liability statute.
Consequently, as the discussion below demonstrates, the du-
ties of Messrs. Canner and Barker are modified accordingly.
1. The Government failed to prove that Mr. Can-
ner did not exercise the proper level of vigilance
under section 6928(d) (3).
If 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) was a strict liability statute,
then corporate officials might be expected to exercise exces-
sive levels of vigilance to prevent violations. However,
[t]he imposition of criminal liability on a corporate offi-
cial ... for engaging in conduct which only after the fact
is determined to violate the statute ... without inquiring
into the intent with which it was undertaken, holds out
the distinct possibility of over deterrence; ... conduct ly-
ing close to the borderline of impermissible conduct
might be shunned by businessmen who choose to be ex-
cessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding
possible exposure to criminal punishment for even a
good-faith error of judgment.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 441. "[W]here the
conduct proscribed is difficult to distinguish from conduct
permitted . . .the excessive caution spawned by a regime of
strict liability will not necessarily redound to the public's ben-
efit." Id. at 441-442 n. 17. With strict liability statutes, "exces-
sive caution . . . is entirely consistent with the legislative pur-
pose." Id. (citing Park, 421 U.S. at 671-672). Thus, United
States Gypsum Co. cautions that in a non-strict liability set-
ting, imposing a duty of excessive caution or vigilance may not
benefit the public, particularly where prohibited acts are diffi-
cult to distinguish from lawful conduct. Where prohibited acts
are difficult to distinguish from lawful conduct, imposing lia-
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bility without first inquiring whether the defendant acted cul-
pably "holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence."
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 441.
The district court held Mr. Canner liable because
"[o]therwise we will be establishing incentives for other corpo-
rate executives to insulate themselves from knowing anything
about the environmental actions of their companies" (R.6). In
essence, the district court refused to acquit Mr. Canner be-
cause he delegated authority for environmental compliance to
Mr. Barker. If § 6928(d)(3) imposed strict liability, then cor-
porate officers might reasonably be expected to exercise exces-
sive caution. However, § 6928(d)(3) does not impose strict lia-
bility. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to grant Mr. Canner's motion for acquittal when the
facts in the record do not establish that Mr. Canner was not
acting in good faith. The district court committed precisely
what United States v. Gypsum Co. warned against - engag-
ing in overdeterrence.
Mr. Barker, unlike Mr. Canner, did not exercise the
proper level of vigilance. Mr. Canner imposed an affirmative
duty on Mr. Barker to ensure that the plant operated within
the parameters of environmental laws (R.3). If any violation is
found, it is because Mr. Barker failed to exercise vigilance to
ensure Mr. Adams did not make any false statements to the
EPA, or because he did not promptly correct the violation
once he learned about it (R. 4).
2. The government failed to prove that Mr. Canner
could have foreseen the violation and taken
steps to prevent its occurrence.
Foreseeability is generally a question of fact for the jury.
However, when the evidence at trial is insufficient to maintain
a conviction, the defendant should be acquitted. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 29(a). The government has failed "in its ultimate burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt" that Mr. Canner could
have foreseen yet failed to prevent or correct the violation.
Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine is a method of
1991]
37
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
holding responsible corporate officials "criminally liable for
'causing' violations." Id. Mr. Barker had an affirmative duty
to ensure that the New Union plant operated within the pa-
rameters of the environmental laws (R.3). Any alleged viola-
tion occurred because Mr. Barker induced Mr. Adams to take
some "advice." The record demonstrates that Adams took
that "advice" from Mr. Barker, relying on Mr. Barker's supe-
rior position in the company, skill and knowledge (R.4). Mr.
Barker's failure to perform his duty by giving Mr. Adams the
wrong advice, and then failing to remedy any alleged viola-
tions after Mr. Adams reported the violation with the Inspec-
tor to Mr. Barker, breaks any causal thread of liability run-
ning to Mr. Canner. In Re Bell & Beckwith, 50 B.R. 422, 432
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
Mr. Canner cannot be held to have failed to exercise the
requisite level of foresight because he had no notice of the al-
legedly false statement. Moreover, Mr. Canner had no notice
that he could not rely on Mr. Barker to prevent violations
from occurring or remedying them once they do occur. There-
fore, Mr. Canner could not have exercised any level of fore-
sight to prevent the alleged violation. Mr. Barker's myriad of
wrongful acts negates the possibility that without notice, Mr.
Canner could have foreseen and therefore acted to prevent the
alleged violation from occurring. In Re Bell & Beckwith, 50
B.R. at 432.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, Appellant Canner respectfully
requests that the judgment of the United States District
Court for the District Court of New Union be reversed as to
him, and that this court enter a judgment of acquittal in his
favor.
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